Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good. by Klaus, Bettina et al.
Reallocation of an in®nitely divisible good
w
Bettina Klaus, Hans Peters, and Ton Storcken
Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, THE NETHERLANDS
Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996
Summary. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endow-
ments of an in®nitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked
preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which
satis®es many appealing properties, describing the eﬀect of population and
endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are
studied in this context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency,
(endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness. Further-
more, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satis®es several
equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment and envy-freeness. We study the
trade-oﬀ between properties concerning variation and properties concerning
equity. Furthermore, we provide several characterizations of the uniform
reallocation rule based on these properties.
JEL Classi®cation Numbers: D71.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study situations where the total of initial endowments of an
in®nitely divisible good is reallocated among a group of agents. In many
cases where free disposal of the good is not allowed (non-price models) it is
natural to assume that the agents' preferences over their shares of the good
are single-peaked. Each agent has an optimal share of the good, below which
and above which preference is decreasing.
There is a wide literature exploring the situation where the problem is
reduced to the allocation of a total endowment. As described in Sprumont
[12], rationing in a two-good economy in which prices are in disequilibrium
can be interpreted as such a distribution problem with total endowment. A
solution for this class of problems satisfying many appealing properties is the
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Correspondence to: H. Petersuniform rule. Benassy [2] described the uniform rule as a strategy-proof
rationing scheme: an agent who misrepresents his preference cannot improve
his outcome. Sprumont [12] started the axiomatic analysis in 1991. He
proved that the uniform rule is the only rule which satis®es Pareto optim-
ality, strategy-proofness and anonymity. Ching [3] weakens anonymity to a
condition called equal treatment of equals: agents announcing the same
preferences are treated equally. The axiomatic analysis of Thomson (see [13],
[14] and [15]) provides several characterizations of the uniform rule including
consistency and monotonicity properties.
In this paper we study similar properties in the more general setting of
economies where agents have initial endowments. This extension of the
model quite naturally arises if we observe distribution problems with total
endowments where preferences might change over time. Consider for ex-
ample the distribution of a task (e.g., ®xed amount of teaching hours) among
the members of a group. The (single-peaked) preferences of the agents do not
only depend on the total endowment, but also on external factors (time for
research, other tasks) which are not ®xed. So, over time, preferences might
change, calling for a reallocation of the task.
Another interpretation of the model can be found in a recent paper by
Barbera Á, Jackson and Neme [1] who study sharing problems where agents
might have natural claims, or are treated with diﬀerent priorities. In this
setting they characterize the class of distribution rules that are strategy-proof
and Pareto optimal, but which allow for an asymmetric treatment of the
agents. Adding a third condition, describing a kind of individual mono-
tonicity, yields a subclass of strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules which
they call sequential allotment rules and which they consider to be a natural
extension of the procedure which underlies the uniform rule. By applying
uniform division in the stepwise de®nition of a sequential allotment rule,
thereby reducing the computation to one step, the uniform reallocation rule,
introduced in Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6], is obtained.
In Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6] the main result is the characterization of
the uniform reallocation rule by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, re-
versibility and an equal-treatment condition which is based on the pre-
ferences and the net demands of the agents. Reversibility guarantees a
symmetrical treatment between reallocation problems in excess demand and
reallocation problems in excess supply. In Klaus, Peters and Storcken [7]
some variations of the reallocation model (e.g. allowing for debts) and their
impact on the characterization result are studied.
Like the uniform rule, the uniform reallocation rule satis®es many de-
sirable properties, which we study here. We can strengthen equal-treatment
to envy-freeness which, in our setting, is formalized in terms of allotment
changes and not in terms of the outcome as in the case of dividing a total
endowment. Our ®rst result (Theorem 3.1) is that, similar to the total en-
dowment case (see Thomson [14], Lemma 1), the uniform reallocation rule is
the unique reallocation rule satisfying Pareto optimality, peaks-onliness and
envy-freeness.
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ference variations on the outcome, and Pareto optimality, the uniform re-
allocation rule has several properties incorporating the variation of the
remaining model assumptions.
One such property, introduced by Thomson [15] for the total endowment
case, is population monotonicity. In the reallocation case this property
describes the impact of merging two reallocation problems. We show
(Theorem 3.2) that in the characterization of Theorem 3.1 peaks-onliness can
be replaced by population monotonicity.
A further monotonicity property, endowment monotonicity, describes the
change of the solution if certain endowment variations are considered. By
decreasing (increasing) the endowments in case of excess demand (supply), no
individual is better oﬀ than before. This monotonicity condition is an ex-
tension of the one-sided resource-monotonicity of Thomson [14], introduced
for division problems. Thomson proves ([14], Theorem 2) that the uniform
rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, envy-freeness and one-sided
resource-monotonicity for a restricted domain of single-peaked, continuous
preferences. For the reallocation case a similar result (Theorem 4.4) can be
deduced where the conditions of envy-freeness and monotonicity are adapted
as indicated above. However, the proof of this characterization of the uni-
form reallocation rule is based on a diﬀerent argument and remains valid for
the whole domain of single-peaked preferences.
The next property of the uniform reallocation rule we study is bilateral
consistency. For the total endowment case, bilateral consistency of a rule
requires the following. Consider a division assigned by a rule and assume
that all agents except two leave with their assigned quantities of the good. If
the remaining agents divide the remaining endowment again by applying the
same rule, then they receive the same shares as before. Thomson [13] pro-
vides two characterizations of the uniform rule by means of Pareto optim-
ality, bilateral consistency and continuity in the total amount to divide. In
the ®rst characterization ([13], Theorem 1) envy-freeness singles out the
uniform rule. In the second characterization ([13], Theorem 2) envy-freeness
is replaced by individual rationality from equal division: no agent, after the
distribution, is worse oﬀ than in the case of equally dividing the total en-
dowment. In a recent study, Dagan shows that the continuity property may
be skipped (see [4], Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
For reallocation problems, bilateral consistency will be based on two-
agent subeconomies in which the leftover (supply or demand) of the de-
parting agents is, up to domain restrictions, added equally to the endow-
ments of the remaining agents. For more explanation see Section 5. It will be
shown that bilateral consistency and individual rationality together with
Pareto optimality determine the uniform reallocation rule for reallocation
problems with at least three agents (Theorem 5.2). For reallocation problems
with at least four agents individual rationality can be replaced by envy-
freeness (Theorem 5.3). The proofs of Dagan's characterizations ([4], The-
orem 2 and Theorem 3) can be adapted to the reallocation case. This yields
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four agents. Further characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule can
be obtained by Pareto optimality, bilateral consistency and extra conditions,
for instance boundedness (of the outcome) by endowments and peaks
(Theorem 5.1)
Finally, endowment strategy-proofness is studied. If initial endowments
are private information it might happen that agents manipulate the outcome
by only reporting±showing±a smaller part of their endowments. Reallocation
rules where agents cannot pro®t from withholding parts of their endowments
are called endowment strategy-proof. Endowment strategy-proofness to-
gether with Pareto optimality, bilateral consistency and the dummy property
(agents who have their peak as initial endowment do not participate in the
reallocation) characterizes the uniform reallocation rule (Theorem 6.3). In
Theorem 6.4 we show that we can replace endowment strategy-proofness
and the dummy property by equal-treatment and a reversibility property
which is stronger than the reversibility condition as introduced in Klaus,
Peters and Storcken [6]. This latter condition links the outcomes of excess
demand and excess supply. To be more precise, consider a situation with
demanders, having their peaks above their initial endowments, and suppliers,
having their peaks below their initial endowments. Now this situation is
reversed by turning demanders into suppliers with supply equal to their
former demand and suppliers into demanders in a similar way. Reversibility
requires that the allotment changes of the latter problem are opposite to
those of the former.
We conclude by giving a short overview (as far as we are aware of it) over
recent research on the reallocation problem and the uniform reallocation rule
in particular. In Thomson [16] reallocation problems as considered here and
their extensions to ``open economies''±reallocation problems where in addi-
tion to the individual endowments a total endowment has to be distributed±
are studied. In particular several extensions of allocation rules (e.g., uniform
rule, proportional rule, equal-distance solution) and their properties are
discussed. The axiomatic analysis provides impossibility as well as possibility
results (characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule or its extended
version). Some of the properties under consideration are envy-freeness,
monotonicity with respect to the individual and the total endowment,
strategy-proofness, consistency and population monotonicity. A similar ap-
proach can be found in Moreno [9]. Moreno focusses on envy-freeness and
population monotonicity properties. In Klaus [6] the axiomatic analysis
started here is continued. It is shown that Pareto optimality is implied by
individual rationality and endowment monotonicity. This result is used to
obtain two characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule, namely by
individual rationality, endowment monotonicity and envy-freeness or bi-
lateral consistency respectively.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
the uniform reallocation rule. In Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 we introduce the
equity and variation properties which yield several characterizations of the
308 B. Klaus et al.uniform reallocation rule. An overview over the results is given in Section 7
and the independence of the axioms used in the characterizations is shown.
Furthermore, a discussion of the sensitivity of the model assumptions is
included.
2 Reallocations
Consider exchange economies with a single good for which the agents have
single-peaked (ordinal) utility, for instance strictly concave utility functions
with a global optimum. So, the commodity space is one dimensional: R
￿.
Let i be an agent. Then his utility function ui is a continuous function from
R
￿ to R such that
￿ there is a unique point
^ ui at which ui is maximal




















^ ui is called the peak of i. Denote the set of all these utility
functions by U. A set of agents is denoted by N
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strictly less than his peak
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￿may be positive, zero, or negative. If it is
positive we say that the problem has excess demand. If it is zero, the problem
is balanced and one would expect that the reallocation is such that every










































￿ for at least one agent j
2 N
:
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low. Therefore, a reallocation x
2 RN





precisely when x is same-sided, i.e., xi
￿
^ ui for all i
2 N or xi
￿
^ ui for all i
2 N.
Consequently, a reallocation x
2 RN
￿ is Pareto optimal if and only if,
xi
￿
^ ui for all i
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< 0 (excess supply).
Sprumont [12] uses same-sidedness as de®nition of Pareto optimality.
In several properties, discussed hereafter, the number of agents is not
®xed, therefore solutions will be de®ned over the set of all problems. To
avoid repetition of the Pareto optimality condition, it is incorporated in the
de®nition of a rule as follows.
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By de®nition, the uniform reallocation rule is same-sided and therefore
Pareto optimal and well-de®ned as a reallocation rule. It works as follows. If
there is excess demand, then all suppliers and non-traders get their peaks.
Demanders either receive their peaks or get maximal equal allotment change
k. In excess supply all non-satiated agents get minimal allotment change
￿k.
Hence, agents are either satiated or receive the same (maximal or minimal)
allotment change. In fact, combined with Pareto optimality this determines
exactly the uniform reallocation rule. For later reference, we state this ob-
servation as a lemma.















problem is of excess demand,









problem is of excess supply.
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In this section we focus on rules which base the outcomes on the peaks
instead of the complete utility functions. The uniform reallocation rule is
such a rule. Moreover, it will appear to be the only rule which satis®es this
condition and at which no agent envies another one. Furthermore, a
monotonicity condition is discussed. It is shown that this condition and envy-
freeness imply the peaks-onliness condition. Because the uniform realloca-
tion rule satis®es this condition, this implication yields a second character-
ization of this rule.



































So, a pre-rule w is peaks-only if, and only if, the outcomes only depend on
the peaks of the utility functions and not on the whole functions. As a
manner of speaking, peaks-only rules ignore intensities and ordinality of
preferences. Nevertheless, many well-known rules are peaks-only. The uni-
form rule for allocation problems without initial endowments as de®ned in
Sprumont [12], proportional rules with respect to peaks or endowments and
hierarchical rules (see Section 7) are peaks-only. It is evident that by its
de®nition the uniform reallocation rule is also peaks-only. Clearly, if a rule
takes intensities into account, then it is apt to be vulnerable to strategic
behavior and more diﬃcult to apply.
















































So, i envies j if i prefers j's allotment change or the part of j's allotment
change which is feasible for him to his own allotment change. The uniform
reallocation rule is envy-free. For instance, in case of excess demand, only
demanders can be non-satiated and, if so, they obtain the same, maximal
allotment change.
The well-known property of envy-freeness was introduced by Foley [5] for
resource allocation problems. Envy-freeness for division problems with sin-
gle-peaked preferences was ®rst used by Sprumont in his axiomatic analysis
of the uniform rule, [12]. A concept of envy-freeness in terms of allotment
changes±called fair net trade±as introduced above was formulated by
Schmeidler and Vind [11] in the more general context of exchange economies.
The following theorem characterizes the uniform reallocation rule as the
only rule which is envy-free and peaks-only1. The main idea of the proof is
1 Unless mentioned otherwise, the expression ``characterization'' implies the logical indepen-
dence of the characterizing axioms. For all characterizations appearing in this paper, however,
the discussion of logical independence of the axioms is postponed to Section 7.
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agents are maximal or minimal, depending on whether the problem is in
excess demand or in excess supply. As this typically describes the uniform
reallocation rule, we are done.
The theorem and its proof are similar to Lemma 3 and its proof in
Thomson [14], which treats the case of total endowment instead of initial
endowments.
Theorem 3.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only envy-free and peaks-
only rule.
Proof. Clearly, the uniform reallocation rule is an envy-free and peaks-only






































> 0 (excess demand). By Lemma 2.1 it is suﬃcient to prove that
non-satiated agents get maximal allotment changes at u. Let i
2 N be a non-
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there is a utility pro®le v
2 UN, such that
^ v
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The following characterization of the uniform reallocation rule involves
population monotonicity. Loosely speaking, a rule is population monotonic
if merging two disjoint problems either both of excess demand or both of
excess supply, makes in one subgroup either all agents weakly better oﬀ or all
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prefer it the other way around.




















































































i is the vector x in RN
[N
0
￿ such that xi
￿ ei for all i





























>0 if, and only if, both problems have
excess demand or both problems have excess supply.
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i. Suppose for j the con-
312 B. Klaus et al.verse holds. Then i and j must be demanders. Hence, the agents i and j are




















































































i, or all are weakly worse oﬀ. The proof
for problems with excess supply is similar.
Hence, the uniform reallocation rule is population monotonic. Moreover,
the following theorem shows that envy-freeness and population mono-
tonicity characterize the uniform reallocation rule.
Theorem 3.2. The uniform reallocation rule is the only envy-free and population
monotonic rule.
Proof. In order to prove that Ur is the only envy-free and population
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This section provides a characterization of the uniform reallocation rule
which is based on an endowment monotonicity property. Endowment
monotonicity means that if, in case of excess demand, the individual en-
dowments decrease (or increase in case of excess supply), then no individual is
better oﬀ after the change. The characterization says that the uniform re-
allocation rule is the only rule which is endowment monotonic and envy-free.
The stages of the proof of this characterization are as follows. First it is
shown that endowment monotonicity and Pareto optimality imply co-
ordinatewise continuity. Then another preliminary result is obtained. It says
that endowment monotonic and envy-free rules have the dummy property.
Reallocation of an in®nitely divisible good 313This latter condition means that non-traders are left on their endowments,
hence receive zero allotment change. Next we show that endowment
monotonic rules which satisfy the dummy property, assign allotments
somewhere between the individual endowments and peaks. With these results
the characterization follows easily.
Because the properties, dealt with in this section, leave the group size and
utilities unchanged, we ®x the set of agents at N and the pro®le of utility




i is now denoted by e. Let x and
y be two vectors in RN
￿. Then x
￿ y means that xi
￿ yi for all i
2 N.
We say that the pre-rule w is endowment monotonic or monotonic, if for all
problems e and e


































￿ for all i
2 N.
In [14], Thomson introduced endowment monotonicity properties for
division problems. His one-sided resource-monotonicity corresponds to our
monotonicity property. Other variations of endowment monotonicity for the
reallocation setting and its extension to open economies are discussed in
Thomson [16].







￿ for all i
2 N and all e
￿ e
0 in RN















2 N, let e
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;i
￿ denote a vector of endow-

















unilateral change of e by agent i. Furthermore, a denotes i's endowment in
that change.












The following lemma states that monotonic rules are coordinatewise
continuous. A similar result for allocation problems, without initial en-
dowments, can be found in Thomson [14] (in the proof of Theorem 2).
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> 0 for all t
2 N. Hence, by same-sidedness, it follows
that x
￿
^ u and xt
￿
^ u for all t
2 N. Now, by monotonicity, xt
￿ x for all
t




























































< 0 for all t
￿ t0. Without
loss of generality let t0
￿ 1. The proof proceeds similar to Case 1. h
A pre-rule w is said to have the dummy property, if for all non-traders j at





Lemma 4.2. Let u be a monotonic and envy-free rule. Then u has the dummy
property.









￿0 because otherwise, by Pareto optimality, every agent gets his
peak. We assume z
￿e
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: Furthermore, by monotonicity it is
without loss of generality (lower the endowments if necessary) to assume that
all agents, except agent j, have either maximal demand or zero as initial
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gand monotonicity it follows that, for all i
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Now we prove that ae
i
￿ 0 for all i
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￿ j and 0
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￿ aand all i
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￿ j:
2 For problems in excess supply, assume that all suppliers have equal maximal supply.







































Boundedness by endowments and peaks implies the dummy property.
Furthermore, boundedness by endowments and peaks implies individual











The following lemma shows that under monotonicity and same-sidedness the
dummy property is equivalent to boundedness by endowments and peaks.
Lemma 4.3. Let u be a monotonic rule which has the dummy property. Then u
is bounded by endowments and peaks.
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Finally, we prove the characterization of this section.3 h
Theorem 4.4. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is envy-free
and monotonic.
Proof. The uniform reallocation rule satis®es both properties. In order to
prove that it is the only one let u be a rule with these properties, and consider





By same-sidedness and boundedness by endowments and peaks (Lemmas









: By Lemma 2.1 it is
3 We did not succeed in proving the independence of this characterization. To be more precise, it
is an open problem whether Pareto optimality is independent of the other properties on the
general domain of single-peaked, continuous preferences.
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: But then either feasibility or boundedness
by endowments and peaks is violated. h
Results on endowment monotonicity for allocation rules can be found in
Thomson [14]. There, a characterization of the uniform allocation rule for a
restricted class of single-peaked preferences4 by one-sided resource-mono-
tonicity and envy-freeness is derived. Theorem 4.4, which can be seen as an
extension of this result to the reallocation case, is based on a diﬀerent proof
technique, and holds for the whole domain of single-peaked preferences.
5 Consistency
In this section three characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule are
discussed. Consistency essentially means that under the mechanism at hand
subgroups of agents do not redistribute their subtotal diﬀerently. So, if a
group S of agents leaves with their allotments, then, loosely speaking, ap-
plying the mechanism for the remaining agents yields the same outcome as
before. In a reallocation problem, by leaving the grand coalition the agents
of S create an allocation problem: the (positive or negative) leftover of S has
to be distributed among the remaining agents. Then, the original endow-
ments plus the shares of the leftover form the initial endowments in the
restricted reallocation problem. In order to preserve the original positions of
the remaining agents, we de®ne the reduced reallocation problem by equal5
adjustment of the initial endowments. Thus, we include an equity principle







g which assigns to each point either the corresponding
indiﬀerence point on the other side of the peak, and zero or in®nity if such a indiﬀerence point
does not exists, has to be bounded. However, on this preference domain we can prove that
Pareto optimality is implied by envy-freeness and monotonicity.
5 As equal as possible with respect to the restrictions of the model.
Reallocation of an in®nitely divisible good 317into the consistency condition. Actually, we will only need consistency for
two-agent problems, i.e., bilateral consistency.6
The relation with Thomson's bilateral consistency for the allocation
setting is illustrated by comparing Theorem 2 in [13], where the uniform rule
is characterized by bilateral consistency, individual rationality from equal
division, and Pareto optimality7, with Theorem 5.2 below, in which the
uniform reallocation rule is characterized by bilateral consistency, individual
rationality, and Pareto optimality.8
First we prove that the uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is
bilaterally consistent and bounded by endowments and peaks. Then we show
that replacing the latter condition by the weaker individual rationality con-
dition, yields a second characterization of the uniform reallocation rule for
problems with at least three agents. Finally we show that for problems with
at least four agents, bilateral consistency and envy-freeness determine the
uniform reallocation rule.











































i denotes the restriction of u to
fi
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So, endowment adjustments are as close as possible9 to the mean allotment
changes of i and j. It is straightforward to prove that the adjusted endow-
6 Another possibility for the two-agent subeconomy would be to give these agents their
allotments in the original problem as initial endownments. This would lead to a very weak
consistency property, already implied by Pareto optimality and individual rationality±which is
not surprising because the allotments of the rule under consideration would already have been
incorporated in the formulation of the subeconomy also for the remaining agents. Furthermore,
information from the original problem concerning the relative strength of the agents with respect
to demand and supply would be lost.
7 Dagan [4] has shown that continuity is redundant.
8 As considered by Thomson [16] one could extend the model by allowing the total endowment
to be unequal to the sum of the initial endowments, thus combining allocation and reallocation.
In such a model, Thomson's bilateral consistency for reallocations can be adapted in a
straightforward manner, see Thomson [16]. In a characterisation, however, one would need
again some equity principle.
9 By just applying mean allotment changes negative endowments, which are not admissable in
this model, might occur.






















































It is straightforward to prove that the uniform reallocation rule is bilaterally
consistent.
The next theorem characterizes this rule as described before.
Theorem 5.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bilaterally
consistent and bounded by endowments and peaks.














￿ . For two-agent problems and balanced pro-
blems this follows easily.

























Now, by Lemma 2.1, it is suﬃcient to show that non-satiated demanders get






































































































































































; this cannot be the case.
Hence, we have a contradiction and are done.
The case of excess supply with possibly adjusted endowments is proven
similarly. h
Note that Theorem 5.1 holds also if we ®x N.
The following theorem shows that under Pareto optimality and bilateral
consistency the boundedness condition of the previous theorem and in-
dividual rationality are equivalent if there are at least three agents.
Reallocation of an in®nitely divisible good 319Theorem 5.2. For problems with at least three agents, the uniform reallocation
rule is the only individually rational and bilaterally consistent rule.
Proof. Let u be an individually rational and bilaterally consistent rule. It is
suﬃcient to prove that u is bounded by endowments and peaks (Theorem













































^ ui. We deduce a contradiction and are done.
















































































































































































































































￿0 and because of the choice of





















































































: By adding non-traders in































































￿ for all t
2 N
:
This obviously yields a contradiction.
The case of excess supply with possibly adjusted endowments is proven
similarly. h
The previous theorem holds if we ®x N and if N has at least three agents.
For ®xed N with two agents the theorem does not hold, because in that
situation bilateral consistency has no impact.
The last characterization in this section is obtained by extending a result
of Dagan ([4], Lemma 2) to reallocation rules and applying bilateral con-
sistency and Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 5.3. For problems with at least four agents the uniform reallocation
rule is the unique rule satisfying envy-freeness and bilateral consistency.
As already mentioned above, we use in the proof of Theorem 5.3 the
following extension of a result of Dagan ([4], Lemma 2) for allocation rules.
Lemma 5.4. Let there be at least four agents. If a rule is bilaterally consistent
and envy-free, then the rule satis®es peaks-onliness for all two-agent problems.
The proof of Lemma 5.4 is similar to the proof of Dagan's result [4],
Lemma 2.










g . To show peaks-onliness we have to






























































































































































































By applying bilateral consistency on N and N
0 as remaining agents we obtain




























































































































Hence, by ((10) and (11)) the lemma is proven. h
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let u be a bilaterally consistent and envy-free rule.
Then, bilateral consistency together with Lemma 5.4 implies peaks-onliness
for problems with an arbitrary number of agents n
￿ 4. Then, by Theorem
3.1 the rule u equals the uniform reallocation rule for problems with at least
four agents. h
In Thomson [13] and Dagan [4] results similar to those described in
Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 are stated for allocation rules. Thomson in-
cludes a continuity condition in his characterizations ([13], Theorem 1,
Theorem 2), besides bilateral consistency, individual rationality from equal
division or envy-freeness respectively. Dagan proves that the results of
Thomson remain true without continuity for allocation problems with at
least four agents ([4], Theorem 2, Theorem 3). Now, ``translating'' the steps
of the proofs 10 in Dagans characterizations into the reallocation setting is
almost suﬃcient to get alternative proofs of Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3.
The argument of converse consistency (see [4], Lemma 4), which completes
the proofs of the characterizations, however, has no equivalent in the re-
allocation setting. By assuming that a rule, satisfying the characterizing
properties, does not equal the uniform reallocation rule, and using bilateral
consistency, a contradiction, which completes the alternative proofs, is easily
derived.
6 Strategy-proofness
In this section we discuss characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule in
which endowment strategy-proofness plays a prominent role. This condition
makes sense in those situations where the initial endowments are private
information and the preferences are known. It guarantees, so to speak, that
withholding some of the endowment by an agent is not pro®table for that
agent, whatever the other agents do. So, truth-telling is a weakly dominant
10 [4], Lemmas 2, 3, 5 and 6 can be proved in their ``reallocation version''.
322 B. Klaus et al.strategy. If agents were also allowed to oﬀer more than their actually
possession, then feasibility could cause that some agents obtain a negative
allocation. Because our model does not allow such assignments, supplies are
considered to be real amounts handed out to the mechanism. Then, demands
can be faked only by withholding endowment.
The notion of manipulation by withholding initial endowments±W-ma-
nipulability±is introduced by Postlewaite [10] for pure exchange economies.
However, in this setting ``endowment strategy-proof'' mechanisms do not
exist (see [10], Theorem 1), whereas in our setting for example the uniform
reallocation rule has this property.




i, all agents i
































If i acts strategically and pretends to have e
0






￿ to i. But, as endowments are private information, w can
better be interpreted as a pre-rule which assigns allotment changes. So, i's







proofness is de®ned in this way. It means that i cannot envy himself in a
situation of withholding endowment.
The following Lemma shows that if a rule is strategy-proof, then with-
holding endowment by non-satiated agents yields a smaller allotment
change, in case of excess demand, and a greater allotment change, in case of
excess supply.
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￿, by same-sidedness, it follows that the latter cannot be the case.






^ ui, we shift ei
stepwise (with the size of the steps small enough) to e
0
i and apply the same
argument as above in each step. h
We have the following consequence of the previous lemma.








































^ u k for all k






￿ such that e
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completes the proof. h
A similar result cannot be obtained for the excess supply case, even if
there were an upper bound for the endowments. (For instance, if there are




￿ ei. Therefore, strategy-proofness as de®ned here, has not
such a great impact on the solution as one would expect. The following
theorem characterizes the uniform reallocation rule as the only strategy-
proof and bilaterally consistent rule which has the dummy property. Re-
calling Theorem 5.2, Theorem 6.3 implies that, if there are at least three
agents, under bilateral consistency and Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness
together with the dummy property is equivalent to individual rationality.
Theorem 6.3. Let there be at least three agents. Then, the uniform reallocation
rule is the only rule which is bilaterally consistent, strategy-proof, and has the
dummy property.
Proof. In order to prove that Ur is the only rule with these properties, let u be




i be a problem. If there is excess demand we are done




















< 0. We prove




i. Then in view of
Theorem 5.1 we are done.
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i agent j is either a
non-trader or at e















































^ u j. Suppose,












￿0 by the previous step of the proof. By bilateral con-
sistency



































￿ . Above, we proved that sup-










































































. This cannot be the case. h
For the second and last characterization of this section the condition of
reversibility is introduced.































































Clearly, by applying reversibility two times we obtain that a solution only





































In particular, this means that reversibility implies peaks-onliness.
In the next theorem we use the following equal-treatment condition.
























The equal-treatment and the reversibility condition we introduce here are
stronger than the corresponding conditions introduced in Klaus, Peters and
Storcken [6] for reallocation rules.
By de®nition the uniform reallocation rule satis®es reversibility and
equal-treatment. The following theorem says that it is the only such rule
which in addition is strategy-proof.
Theorem 6.4. The uniform reallocation rule is the only reversible, equally-
treating and strategy-proof rule.
Proof. Let u be such a rule. By reversibility it is suﬃcient to consider only
























Because u only depends on demands and supplies it is without loss of
generality to suppose that
^ ui
￿
^ uj for all i
;j
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2 M, and ek
￿
￿ ek for all
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2 N





































Clearly, this is suﬃcient.
Because N and u are ®xed, we suppress these symbols from notation in




















Then equal-treatment and (13) yield (12).




￿1and suppose (12) holds for all





Suppose (12) does not hold for problem e. Then, by (13), there is a
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Therefore by (15) and (16) we obtain (14). h
326 B. Klaus et al.7 Overview, sensitivity analysis, and independence of the conditions
In the preceding sections eight characterizations of the uniform reallocation
rule were presented. To illustrate the relation between these theorems, we
start this section with a schematic overview of all results. Combining some of
the results immediately yields an ninth characterization (Theorem 7.1) by
means of bilateral consistency, monotonicity and the dummy property. Next,
we discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to variations of the model
assumptions. Finally, independence of the conditions in the characterizations
is demonstrated.
7.1 Overview of the results
The following diagram illustrates the logical connections between the results
of the foregoing sections.













Theorem 7.111 (which is added to the diagram) is directly implied by
Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 7.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only monotonic rule
satisfying bilateral consistency and the dummy property.
7.2 Sensitivity analysis
The table below indicates the eﬀect of four diﬀerent model variations on the
obtained results. The entries in the cells indicate whether the results remain
true. The details are discussed below.
(1) In the model presented here, initial endowments and allotments were
restricted to non-negative numbers. In other settings one might allow
agents to be in debt. In that case, negative endowments and, as a con-
11 We did not succeed in proving the independence of this characterization. More precisely, it is
an open problem whether Pareto optimality is independent of the other properties.
Reallocation of an in®nitely divisible good 327sequence, negative allotments are admitted and preferences are de®ned
on the whole real line. Most of the results remain true with little changes
in the proofs. In case of bilateral consistency, mean leftover changes for
the remaining agents are no longer subject to a non-negativity restriction.
The same holds for envy-freeness. This does not aﬀect the proofs.
However, the proof of Corollary 6.2 is not valid any more. It is an open
question whether Corollary 6.2 or Theorem 6.3 hold in this setting. For
Theorem 6.4 there is an alternative proof which is not presented here
because of space limitations.
(2) If we suppose that endowments, peaks and allotments are not only non-
negative but also bounded from above, all results except Theorem 6.4
remain valid. Of course, envy-freeness and bilateral consistency must be
adapted to this new situation similarly as in the original model, to
Figure 1
328 B. Klaus et al.guarantee that the (adjusted) endowments, which are used in these con-
ditions, are well-de®ned. In the proof of Theorem 6.4 we cannot apply
reversibility because the reversed problems are not necessarily well-de-
®ned in this setting.
(3) Up to now, we assumed that the set of potential agents is in®nite. This
assumption is crucial for the proof of Theorem 3.2 where we duplicate
the number of agents to exploit population monotonicity. It is an open
problem whether the characterization of Theorem 3.2 holds for a ®nite
set of potential agents. All other results remain true because the proofs of
these theorems apply to a ®xed number of agents.
Table 1
Reallocation of an in®nitely divisible good 329(4) The last model variation we consider concerns the domain of the pre-
ferences. We have assumed throughout that the preferences of the agents
are single-peaked and continuous. In fact continuity is only needed to
prove Lemma 6.1. Whether the characterizations based on this lemma,
Theorem 6.3 and Theorem 6.4, hold true for the whole class of single-
peaked preferences is not yet clear. All other results remain valid.
7.3 Independence of the characterizing conditions
The logical independence of the characterizing conditions in all theorems
stated in the previous sections and earlier in this section is discussed by
means of seven reallocation (pre-)rules. These (pre-)rules are de®ned below.













In case of excess demand (supply), the hierarchical rule uh satiates all
suppliers (demanders) and the demanders (suppliers) according to their



























































































































































































￿ ts. Hence, demanders are satiated according to
their claims. First minimal demands are satiated uniformly. If there is some
supply left, then the next smallest demands are satiated, and so on.










￿ is de®ned similarly with respect to
smallest supplies.
The following rule





































￿ u is equal to the uniform reallocation rule in case of excess






￿1 ei is divided such that all agents have the same supply with re-















































￿ u is equal to the uniform reallocation rule in case of
excess demand and balancedness. In case of excess supply all agents except
the agent(s) with maximal supply are satiated. Feasibility is adjusted on the
















































￿ and k is determined by feasibility.
The following rule























￿ 0 for i






























































The following table shows which of the previous pre-rules satis®es which
of the characterizing conditions. The last nine rows of this table indicate for
each theorem and each pre-rule which condition is not satis®ed by the pre-
rules while all other characterizing conditions are satis®ed.
The last table below illustrates the trade-oﬀs between the diﬀerent char-
acterizations. Roughly speaking there are four groups of conditions; I con-
ditions present in all characterizations (and therefore not interesting with
respect to a trade-oﬀ discussion), II conditions of equity, III conditions re-
lating diﬀerent problems, and IV conditions that bound the outcome.
Table 3
332 B. Klaus et al.Conditions of the ®rst three groups appear in all characterizations. The
last group is only present, when bilateral consistency, which also belongs to
the second group, is one of the characterizing conditions. Clearly, the price
which has to be paid for using this hybrid condition of groups II and III is
either a relatively strong condition of group IV or the weaker dummy
property in combination with strategy-proofness or monotonicity. Com-
paring Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 we see that the trade-oﬀ of relaxing the equity
condition is compensated by the relatively strong reversibility condition of
group IV.
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